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ABSTRACT 
Since the Asian crisis, East Asian companies have been encouraged to improve their 
disclosure practices, thereby increasing the availability of operating, financial and 
corporate governance information to market participants. This research examines 
whether East Asian companies have improved their information environments since 
both the crisis and the introduction of corporate governance codes. The results show 
that the introduction of codes has been associated with a shift in analyst following 
towards smaller companies and an overall reduction in analyst forecast error. This 
indicates an overall improvement and a levelling out of information environments 
across companies. These results are also reflected in the weakened relationships 
between analyst following, analyst forecast error and market value.  
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Introduction 
In the years since the Asian crisis there has been considerable pressure placed on East 
Asian companies to improve their corporate governance. This has included calls for 
improved transparency, stronger external monitoring and heightened investor 
protection.1 As a result, each country has implemented corporate governance codes 
advising companies how to improve their governance and disclosure practices. The 
codes, while not mandatory, have encouraged companies to implement stronger 
corporate governance structures and release more information in a timelier manner to 
market participants. However, as the codes are voluntary there has been considerable 
debate as to whether all companies are making adequate improvements. While other 
research has focused on different aspects of corporate governance,2 this study 
examines the disclosure practices of East Asian companies and determines whether 
their information environments have improved since both the crisis and the 
introduction of corporate governance codes.  
 
As a direct measure of corporate disclosure is not available, this study uses the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts as a proxy for company information environments. 
This follows the work of Lang and Lundholm (1996), who show that companies that 
disclose more information have higher analyst following and lower analyst forecast 
error and dispersion. This approach has been used extensively by prior literature to 
measure the effects of new disclosure regulations in the US and other countries 
(Bailey et al., 2003; Helfin et al., 2003; Irani and Karamanou, 2003; Brown et al., 
1999; Huang et al., 2006). Furthermore, the benefit of this approach is that an overall 
picture of company information environments can be examined, which covers all 
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 See www.acga-asia.org 
2
 Nowland (2007) examines board governance changes since the crisis. 
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types of disclosures (operating, financial and corporate governance) to market 
participants.  
 
Prior research has also shown that company disclosure practices evolve as a balance 
between disclosing more information to lower borrowing costs and keeping valuable 
proprietary information from product market participants (Healy et al., 1995; 
Clarkson et al., 1994). Depending on individual company disclosure policies, this 
could result in a large variation in company disclosure practices. This research 
expects the introduction of corporate governance codes to have two effects on 
company disclosure practices. First, there should be an overall improvement in 
company information environments as more information is released to market 
participants. Second, as corporate governance codes have introduced minimum 
comply-or-explain disclosure standards, there should be a levelling out of information 
environments across companies (larger improvements in companies that were 
previously poorer disclosers).  
 
The results indicate that company information environments did not improve 
immediately after the crisis but have improved since the introduction of corporate 
governance codes. The introduction of codes has been associated with a shift in 
analyst following towards smaller companies and an overall reduction in analyst 
forecast error. This indicates a levelling out of information environments across 
companies and an overall improvement in the usefulness of information being 
disclosed by East Asian companies.  However, the results still indicate that family-
owned companies have poorer information environments than other companies. The 
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levelling out of information environments across companies is also reflected in the 
weakened relationships between analyst following, forecast error and market value.  
 
These results are important for a number of reasons. First, this research indicates that 
the disclosure practices of East Asian companies have improved since the crisis. 
Second, this research suggests that a statutory-backed approach to improve disclosure 
practices is not always necessary. In East Asia an improvement and levelling out of 
information environments has been achieved through the introduction of voluntary 
corporate governance codes. Finally, the results show that analysts in East Asia do 
react to changes in company disclosure policies. Therefore, small companies and 
family-owned companies in particular have an incentive to improve their disclosure 
practices. 
  
Background 
In comparison with the western world, East Asian companies are characterised by 
their concentrated ownership structures, weak corporate governance and poor 
disclosure practices (Claessens et al., 2000; Durnev and Kim, 2005). However, 
following the Asian crisis in 1997-1998 there has been a concerted push to improve 
corporate governance practices in the region. Each nation has created and 
implemented their own corporate governance codes, which advise companies how to 
best improve their corporate governance practices. Hong Kong created its Code on 
Corporate Governance Practices in 2004, Indonesia produced its Code for Corporate 
Governance in 20013, South Korea released its Code of Best Practice for Corporate 
Governance in 1999, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was published in 
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 Jakarta Stock Exchange also implemented new listing requirements in 2000. 
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2000, the Philippines Code of Corporate Governance was established in 2002, 
Singapore’s Code of Corporate Governance was created in 20014, the Taiwan 
Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles were introduced in 2002 and 
Thailand’s Code for Directors of Listed Companies was produced in 1999. 
 
Each of these codes has specific recommendations relating to a number of facets of 
corporate governance, with the underlying theme being the need for improved 
corporate transparency. While the codes themselves are not mandatory, they are 
subject to a comply-or-explain principle, which guarantees a minimum level of 
improved transparency. This means the introduction of the codes should have two 
effects on the disclosure practices of East Asian companies. First, there should be an 
overall improvement in the disclosure practices of the average company, as the codes 
entice companies to disclose more information to market participants. Second, there 
should be a levelling out of disclosure practices across companies as previously 
poorer disclosers meet the new minimum comply-or-explain requirements. Figure 1 
provides a graphical illustration of these two effects.  
 
The basic theory proposed by disclosure research is that increased disclosure by 
companies improves their information environments. This improved transparency can 
then affect firm value by decreasing the cost of capital, increasing the cash flows 
provided to shareholders, or both. However, the major problem faced by transparency 
or disclosure research is obtaining an accurate measure of disclosure quantity and 
quality. This study uses the approach of Lang and Lundholm (1996), whereby the 
characteristics of analyst forecasts are used to proxy for company information 
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 Quarterly reporting was introduced on the Singapore Stock Exchange in 2003. 
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environments. While this is an indirect measure of disclosure activities, its major 
benefit is that it provides an overall measure of company information environments 
through the eyes of analysts. This approach has been used by Bailey et al. (2003), 
Helfin et al. (2003) and Irani and Karamanou (2003) to examine the impact of 
Regulation FD in the United States, by Brown et al. (1999) to investigate the effect of 
statutory sanctions on voluntary disclosure practices in Australia and by Huang et al. 
(2006) to measure the impact of new continuous disclosure regulations on the 
disclosure practices of New Zealand companies. 
 
This study uses three measures of company information environments: analyst 
following, analyst forecast error and forecast dispersion. The general predictions are 
that increased disclosure by companies is associated with increased analyst following, 
lower forecast errors and lower forecast dispersion. However, previous research 
indicates that these are not the only possible relationships. For example, while 
increased disclosure is expected to attract more analysts to companies, Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) note that increased disclosure by companies could reduce the 
benefits of private information acquisition by analysts and actually discourage 
analysts from following these companies. Increased disclosure should result in lower 
forecast errors as analysts base their forecasts on more timely and accurate 
information. However this is only the case if the additional information disclosed by 
companies is useful to analysts. Similarly, increased disclosure by companies should 
result in more consistency (less dispersion) in analyst forecasts. However, if analysts 
process the new information disclosed to them differently it is possible that forecast 
dispersion could increase.  
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This research examines whether East Asian companies have improved their 
information environments after the crisis and following the introduction of corporate 
governance codes. The years after the crisis are examined as this was an opportunity 
for companies to improve their information environments both before and after 
corporate governance codes were introduced. The years after the introduction of 
corporate governance codes are examined as they test for the change the codes have 
had on company information environments. If companies have improved their 
disclosure practices and released more value-relevant information to market 
participants then their information environments are expected to have improved 
resulting in greater analyst following and lower forecast error and dispersion. 
 
In addition, this study examines whether the improvement in information 
environments has been consistent across companies. Previous research covering East 
Asia indicates that larger, faster growing companies that are not owned by family 
founders are more likely to have better governance and disclosure practices (Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Nowland, 2007). Therefore, this study also examines whether 
improvements in information environments have been consistent across these 
company characteristics. Consistent with previous predictions, a larger improvement 
is expected in companies that were previously poorer disclosers. Therefore, in relative 
terms, smaller and family-owned companies are expected to improve their 
information environments the most. However, high growth companies are expected to 
retain better information environments than low growth companies as their incentive 
to disclose more in order to source funds at their lowest possible cost still remains. 
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Finally, this study also examines the relationship between company information 
environments and market value. Previous research indicates a positive relationship 
between company information environments and firm value. This study also 
anticipates a positive relationship between analyst following and market value, and 
negative relationships between forecast error, dispersion and market value. However, 
if the information environments of East Asian companies have levelled out since the 
crisis, then the relationships between information environment variables and market 
value are also expected to weaken. 
 
Data 
This study examines the information environments of sample companies from Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and 
Thailand during the period from 1993 to 2005. The years 1997 and 1998 are excluded 
due to effects from the Asian crisis. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S 
and price and financial data is from Compustat Global. To be included in the sample, 
companies need complete data for each firm-year observation. This includes analyst 
forecast information, two prior years of price data and current and prior year financial 
variables.5 For consistency, only companies with December year-ends are included in 
the sample. Analyst forecast variables are based on forecasts from the entire fiscal 
year.6 The final sample is comprised of 3,109 firm-year observations from 812 
companies across the eight countries. 
 
                                               
5
 The following data constraints were imposed: Forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast 
dispersion less than 1 times earnings, earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings, Tobin’s Q 
ratios between 0 and 10, return on assets between -100% and 500%, leverage between 0 and 100%, 
sales growth between -500% and 500%. 
6
 This provides the largest number of data observations. Results are consistent with just selecting 
forecasts in the 11th month or the final 3 months of the fiscal year. 
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Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the sample observations. Panel A 
indicates that companies in the sample from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore are 
bigger than those from other countries. Tobin’s Q ratios are higher for sample 
companies from Malaysia, Taiwan and Hong Kong and lowest in South Korea and 
Indonesia. Analyst following is highest in Hong Kong, Singapore and the Philippines 
and lowest in Indonesia and Taiwan. Average analyst forecast error is highest in 
South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, and lowest in Malaysia and Hong Kong. 
Forecast dispersion is highest in South Korea and the Philippines and lowest in 
Indonesia, Hong Kong and Malaysia. Overall, these statistics are as expected with 
more analysts following the bigger companies in the bigger markets. To control for 
these cross-country differences, country dummy variables are included in all 
following models. 
 
Panel B shows the descriptive statistics by year. The number of sample companies has 
increased over the sample period, peaking in 2004. The average size of the companies 
has remained steady around US$1 billion. Tobin’s Q ratios were significantly higher 
before the crisis and significantly lower in the years 2000-2002 but have returned to 
the long-term average in the years 2003-2005. Analyst following has remained 
relatively steady until the latter years where it has dropped off. Forecast error 
increased during the years immediately after the crisis and remains slightly higher in 
the latter years. Dispersion was lower in 1994 and higher in 2001 but consistent 
across the other years. 
 
Methodology 
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The three proxies for company information environments are analyst following, 
forecast error and dispersion. Analyst following (FOLLOW) is defined as the number 
of analysts providing earnings forecasts of the company during the fiscal year. 
Forecast error (ERROR) is the absolute value of average forecast earnings per share 
less actual earnings per share all divided by actual earnings per share. Forecast 
dispersion (DISPER) is the standard deviation of earnings per share forecasts divided 
by actual earnings per share.  
 
Previous research has identified numerous controls when modelling information 
environment and disclosure variables (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Durnev and Kim, 
2005). These include company size, growth, risk, earnings surprise and loss firms. 
Larger and faster growing companies are better disclosers due to their available 
resources and need for further funding. Companies that are riskier, have more volatile 
earnings (unexpected earnings surprises) and incur losses are harder for analysts to 
forecast accurately. As there is a potential relationship between analyst following and 
forecast error and dispersion, the error term from the analyst following regressions are 
also included in the ERROR and DISPER models.7 Similarly as there is a potential 
relationship between forecast dispersion and forecast error, the error term from the 
forecast dispersion regressions are also included in the ERROR models.8 These terms 
( WFOLLO ~ ) and ( RDISPE~ ) represent the incremental relationships between analyst 
following and forecast error and dispersion, and between forecast dispersion and 
forecast error after removing the effects of the other control variables.  
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 Higher analyst following could lead to greater dispersion of forecasts and higher average forecast 
errors. 
8
 Greater forecast dispersion indicates less consensus among analysts which could indicate higher 
average forecast errors. 
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The basic models used in the analysis are: 
itLOSSESRISKGROWTHSIZEPCRISFOLLOW εββββββα +++++++= it6it5it4it3it210it                    (1) 
itLOSSESRISKGROWTHSIZEPCODEFOLLOW εββββββα +++++++= it6it5it4it3it210it                       (2) 
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~~
    
87
it6it5it4it3it210it
                (3) 
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LOSSESRISKGROWTHSIZEPCODEERROR
εββ
ββββββα
+++
++++++=
~~
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it6it5it4it3it210it
                   (4) 
ititWFOLLOLOSSESRISKGROWTHSIZEPCRISDISPER εβββββββα ++++++++= ~    7it6it5it4it3it210it        (5) 
ititWFOLLOLOSSESRISKGROWTHSIZEPCODEDISPER εβββββββα ++++++++= ~    7it6it5it4it3it210it         (6) 
where the information environment variables are FOLLOW, ERROR and DISPER, 
PCRIS is a dummy variable equal to one in the years after the crisis (1999-2005), 
PCODE is a dummy variable equal to one in the years after codes were introduced in 
each country, SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets in US dollars, GROWTH is 
one-year sales growth, RISK is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the past 
two years, ES is earnings surprise measured as actual earnings this period minus 
actual earnings last period and LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
company made a loss. The regressions also include country and industry dummy 
variables.9 
 
To measure the relationship between the information environment variables and 
market value the following models are used. The control variables (size, growth, 
return on assets and leverage) control for other influences on the Tobin’s Q ratio 
(Doidge et al., 2004). 
ititititit LEVROAGROWTHSIZEFOLLOW εβββββα ++++++= 5432it10it      TQ                   (7) 
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 Industry control are sector dummy variables as per Campbell (1996). 
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ititititit LEVROAGROWTHSIZEERROR εβββββα ++++++= 5432it10it      TQ                   (8) 
ititititit LEVROAGROWTHSIZEDISPER εβββββα ++++++= 5432it10it      TQ                   (9) 
where TQ is the Tobin’s Q ratio measured as total assets minus book value of equity 
plus market value of equity all divided by total assets, ROA is return on assets and 
LEV is the leverage ratio. The models also include country and industry dummy 
variables. 
 
Results 
Before conducting multivariate tests, the information environment variables were first 
examined using univariate means testing. Table 2 shows the average analyst 
following, forecast error and dispersion before and after the crisis and the introduction 
of codes. Panel A indicates that analyst following has decreased and forecast error and 
dispersion have increased since the crisis. Panel B shows that analyst following has 
decreased, error has remained constant and dispersion has increased following the 
introduction of corporate governance codes. These results are unexpected as they 
suggest that the information environments of East Asian companies have not 
improved since the crisis. However, the results must be interpreted with caution as 
they could be driven by a number of factors, such as (1) different analysts in the 
before and after samples, (2) different companies in the before and after samples, and 
(3) different forecasting conditions in the before and after samples.  
 
In particular, the drop in average analyst following could indicate a shift in analyst 
following to previously unfollowed companies due to the extra information these 
companies are now releasing to the market. If not all analysts follow the same new 
companies this would result in a lower average analyst following across all 
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companies. Panel B of Table 1 supports this with average analyst following 
decreasing as the number of companies covered increased during the latter years of 
the sample period.10 In addition, Figure 2 shows that the size composition of 
companies followed by analysts has changed over the sample period. While there has 
been obvious growth in all size brackets during the latter years of the sample period, 
unreported results show that since the introduction of codes the following of small 
companies has grown 64%, compared to a decline in the following of medium (-23%) 
and large (-33%) companies.11 Panel C of Table 2 confirms this with the analyst 
following of small companies increasing after the introduction of codes, while the 
following of medium and large companies has dropped. This is prima facie evidence 
of a shift in analyst following, to smaller companies in particular, at the same time 
that corporate governance codes have introduced minimum comply-or-explain 
disclosure standards.12 
 
However, while this provides support for improved information environments, 
especially for smaller companies, it provides a challenge for the analyst forecast error 
and dispersion variables. It may mean that the results in Table 2 are being driven by 
different analysts and companies in the before and after samples. To control for this, 
further testing was undertaken on a sub-sample that only includes analyst-firm pairs 
that are in both the before and after samples. The unreported results are the same as 
those in Table 2. This indicates that it is not analyst and company differences driving 
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 Unreported statistics show that growth in companies covered by analysts (over 100%) far 
outstripped the growth in the number of analysts providing forecasts (44%) in the latter years of the 
sample period. On average, analysts are covering an additional 1.6 companies in the latter years (2003-
2005) than previous years. 
11
 Small companies have total assets less than US$100 million – approximately 20% of the sample. 
Medium companies have total assets from US$100 million to US$1 billion – approximately 60% of the 
sample. Large companies have total assets greater than US$1 billion – approximately 20% of the 
sample. 
12
 I/B/E/S have confirmed that this shift in analyst following is not due to any external events such as 
the purchase of addition databases or service providers etc. 
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the results. Another possible explanation for the results in Table 2 is a difference in 
forecasting conditions in the before and after samples. It could be that forecasting was 
much more difficult in the before or after samples. As an indication, average earnings 
surprise has been included in Panels A and B. The panels show that in the after 
samples, the average earnings surprise is roughly double the size of the earnings 
surprise in the before samples. This indicates that forecasting conditions were much 
more difficult in the after sample and could be one reason why there has been no 
obvious reduction in forecast error and dispersion in the after samples. To control for 
differences in forecasting conditions between the periods, earnings surprise has been 
included as a control variable in the multivariate models.13 
 
The results of the multivariate models are now presented in the following tables. 
Table 3 examines the information environment variables before and after the crisis 
and the introduction of codes. PCRIS represents the change in the information 
environment variables in the years after the crisis and PCODE represents the change 
after the introduction of corporate governance codes. The regressions control for size, 
growth, risk, earnings surprise, loss firms and analyst following and forecast 
dispersion (where appropriate). Regressions (1) and (2) show that analyst following 
has dropped significantly since the crisis and even more so since the introduction of 
corporate governance codes. Analyst following is found to be positively related to 
size and negatively related to earnings surprise, loss and growth. Regressions (3) and 
(4) indicate that analyst forecast error is lower after the introduction of corporate 
governance codes, but not immediately after the crisis. Forecast error is negatively 
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 Company specific variables such as size, growth and risk are also included in the multivariate models 
to control for differences across companies. However, control variables for analyst ability are not 
included in the models. The data indicates that new analysts have entered the sample and new 
companies are being covered since the crisis. If anything, this would bias our results against finding an 
improvement in analyst forecast error and dispersion in the multivariate models. 
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related to company size, growth and analyst following and positively related to risk, 
loss, earnings surprise and forecast dispersion. Regressions (5) and (6) indicate that 
forecast dispersion has not changed since both the crisis and the introduction of codes. 
Dispersion is positively related to risk, loss, earnings surprise and analyst following, 
and negatively related to growth. 
 
These results indicate that the introduction of codes rather than the crisis itself has had 
the most significant influence on analyst following and forecast error. At the same 
time that corporate governance codes have introduced minimum comply-or-explain 
disclosure standards, there has been a drop in average analyst following (supportive of 
a shift in analyst following to new companies) and a reduction in analyst forecast 
error.14 These results are indicative of an improvement in the information 
environments of East Asian companies since the introduction of corporate governance 
codes. 
 
To determine, whether the results are consistent across companies the following 
analysis investigates the relationships between the information environment variables 
and company characteristics. Table 3 shows that larger companies have higher analyst 
following and lower forecast error. In addition, faster growing companies are found to 
have lower forecast error and dispersion and lower analyst following (in the first 
regression)15. These results are as expected as larger and faster growing companies 
generally have better information environments. Table 4 examines whether these 
relationships have remained consistent after the crisis and the introduction of the 
codes. In Table 4, the SIZE and GROWTH coefficients represent the relationships 
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 As an indication of economic significance, the forecast error of the average company has dropped by 
5.33 percent since the introduction of corporate governance codes. 
15
 Some analysts are reluctant to follow high growth companies as they can be difficult to forecast. 
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between the information environment variables and company size and growth before 
the crisis/codes and the interaction terms (with PCRIS and PCODE) represent the 
change in the relationships after the crisis/codes. Examining the relationship with size 
first, in five out of six regressions the interaction coefficients are significant and of the 
opposite sign to the SIZE coefficients.16 This indicates that bigger companies had 
higher analyst following, smaller forecast errors and lower dispersion before the 
crisis/codes but after the crisis/codes these relationships have weakened. In other 
words, small companies have seen their analyst following increase and forecast error 
and dispersion decrease relative to large companies. This is indicative of more 
consistency or a levelling out of information environments across East Asian 
companies.  
 
The relationship between the information environment variables and growth is 
different. Faster growing companies are expected to disclose more information to the 
market than other companies as this helps them access funds at a lower cost. This 
additional disclosure by faster growing companies is not expected to be affected by 
the crisis or codes. The results in Table 4 are consistent with this expectation, as none 
of the growth interaction terms are significant.  
 
As previous research has also highlighted a difference between family-owned and 
non-family-owned companies, Table 5 analyses a sub-sample of companies which 
could be identified as either family-owned or non-family-owned.17 The models in 
Table 5 therefore include a dummy variable (FAMILY) equal to one if the company’s 
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 The sixth is of the same sign but not significant. 
17
 Companies are identified as family-owned if their largest shareholder is the family group that 
founded the company. Non-family-owned companies are those where the largest shareholder has been 
identified as not being the founding family. Ownership data is from company annual reports. 
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largest shareholder is a founding family. This sub-sample contains 111 companies and 
748 firm-year observations. Regression (1) indicates an overall negative relationship 
between family ownership and analyst following. The interaction terms in regressions 
(2) and (3) show that this relationship has not improved since the crisis/codes. This 
indicates that family-owned companies have lower analyst following than other 
companies and that the gap has not narrowed since the crisis/codes. Regressions (4) to 
(6) show the relationship between analyst forecast error and family ownership. In all 
regressions there is an insignificant difference between family-owned and non-family-
owned companies. This indicates that if analysts choose to follow family-owned 
companies, their forecast accuracy is just as good as for non-family-owned 
companies. Regressions (7) to (9) test for differences in forecast dispersion between 
family-owned and non-family-owned companies. The only significant result is that 
family-owned companies had lower forecast dispersion before the crisis. After the 
crisis/codes there are no significant differences. Overall, these results indicate that 
family-owned companies have maintained but not improved their poorer information 
environments relative to other companies since the crisis/codes.  
 
Table 6 shows the relationships between the information environment variables and 
market value as measured by the Tobin’s Q ratio. The interaction terms show the 
changes in the relationships after the crisis/codes. Regression (1) shows a significant 
positive relationship between analyst following and market value. In regression (3), 
the significant negative coefficient on FOLLOW*PCODE shows that this relationship 
has weakened since the introduction of codes. This weakened relationship is 
consistent with a shift in analyst following levelling out the information environments 
across companies. Regression (4) indicates a significant negative relationship between 
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analyst forecast error and market value. In regression (6), the significant positive 
coefficient on ERROR*PCODE shows that this relationship has weakened since the 
introduction of codes. This is indicative of an overall improvement and a levelling out 
of information environments across companies. Regression (7) shows a non-
significant relationship between forecast dispersion and market value. However, the 
interaction terms in regressions (8) and (9) both have significant positive coefficients. 
This indicates that a positive relationship between dispersion and value has only 
existed after the crisis/codes. Overall, the relationships between the information 
environment variables and market value are consistent with the levelling out of 
information environments across East Asian companies since the introduction of 
corporate governance codes. 
 
As the univariate analysis in Table 2 indicates that raw errors and dispersion have 
increased since the crisis/codes and that this has most likely been caused by a more 
difficult forecasting environment in the post-crisis and post-code periods, the 
regressions in Table 6 have also been run with the predicted values from models 3 to 
6 in place of the raw error and dispersion variables. The results are the same as those 
presented in Table 6. In addition, as a robustness check all models are also run with 
lagged dependent variables on the right-hand side to control for serial correlation. The 
results are consistent with those presented above. 
 
Conclusion 
Since the Asian crisis, East Asian companies have been encouraged to improve their 
governance and disclosure practices. However, there has been debate as to whether 
there have been any improvements and whether the improvements have been anything 
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more than “window dressing”. This study investigates whether East Asian companies 
have improved their information environments in the years since the crisis and the 
introduction of corporate governance codes. The main results are summarized below. 
 
Company information environments did not improve immediately after the crisis but 
have improved since the introduction of corporate governance codes. The introduction 
of codes has been associated with a shift in analyst following to smaller companies 
and an overall reduction in analyst forecast error. This indicates a levelling out of 
information environments across companies and an overall improvement in the 
usefulness of information being disclosed by East Asian companies. However, the 
results still indicate that family-owned companies have poorer information 
environments than other companies. The levelling out of information environments 
across companies is also reflected in the weakened relationships between analyst 
following, analyst forecast error and market value.  
 
These results are important for a number of reasons. First, this research indicates that 
the disclosure practices of East Asian companies have improved since the crisis. 
Second, this research suggests that a statutory-backed approach to improve disclosure 
practices is not always necessary. In East Asia an improvement and levelling out of 
information environments has been achieved through the introduction of voluntary 
corporate governance codes. Finally, the results show that analysts in East Asia do 
react to changes in company disclosure policies. Therefore, small companies and 
family-owned companies in particular have an incentive to improve their disclosure 
practices. 
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Figure 1 – Expected effect of corporate governance codes on the information 
environments of East Asian companies 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Size composition of companies followed by analysts over the sample 
period (1993-2005)  
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Table 1 – Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A – Descriptive Statistics by Country 
 
Country n Total Assets Tobin’s Q Following Error Dispersion 
Hong Kong 471 2.13 1.57 14.00 0.2781 0.1205 
Indonesia 69 0.12 0.82 2.29 0.3211 0.1160 
Malaysia 555 0.68 1.70 10.86 0.2774 0.1216 
Philippines 131 1.14 1.09 11.86 0.4021 0.1781 
Singapore 418 1.32 1.47 12.71 0.3406 0.1354 
South Korea 302 0.17 0.76 7.93 0.4516 0.1915 
Taiwan 521 1.60 1.63 6.29 0.4158 0.1493 
Thailand 642 0.42 1.45 7.24 0.3861 0.1625 
Total 3109 1.04 1.45 9.71 0.3548 0.1454 
n is the number of firm-year observations. Total Assets are in billions of US dollars. Tobin’s Q ratios are calculated as 
total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity all divided by total assets. Following is the number 
of analysts providing earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. Error is the absolute value of average forecast earnings 
minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided 
by actual earnings. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 
times earnings and Tobin’s Q ratios between 0 and 10. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and 
financial data is from Compustat Global.  
 
 
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics by Year 
 
Year n Total Assets Tobin’s Q Following Error Dispersion 
1993 157 0.85 2.00 11.19 0.2725 0.1338 
1994 174 0.93 1.59 9.49 0.2935 0.0903 
1995 221 1.00 1.54 10.86 0.2954 0.1484 
1996 245 1.07 1.50 9.42 0.3781 0.1387 
1999 270 1.03 1.60 10.77 0.4101 0.1550 
2000 235 1.20 1.21 11.80 0.4319 0.1335 
2001 212 1.16 1.27 13.00 0.4437 0.1729 
2002 252 1.09 1.19 10.40 0.3327 0.1386 
2003 437 0.91 1.45 9.10 0.2947 0.1503 
2004 580 1.06 1.37 7.53 0.3838 0.1586 
2005 326 1.09 1.52 8.09 0.3378 0.1419 
Total 3109 1.04 1.45 9.71 0.3548 0.1454 
n is the number of firm-year observations. Total Assets are in billions of US dollars. Tobin’s Q ratios are calculated as 
total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity all divided by total assets. Following is the number 
of analysts providing earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. Error is the absolute value of average forecast earnings 
minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided 
by actual earnings. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 
times earnings and Tobin’s Q ratios between 0 and 10. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and 
financial data is from Compustat Global.  
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Table 2 – Univariate Means Testing 
 
Panel A – Information Environment Variables Before and After Crisis 
 
 Before After Difference p-value 
Following 10.21 9.53 -0.68 0.07 
Error 0.3155 0.3683 0.0528 0.01 
Dispersion 0.1297 0.1508 0.0212 0.00 
Earnings Surprise 0.0380 0.0792 0.0412 0.00 
n  797 2312 
  
Mean testing of information environment variables from before to after the crisis. Following is the number of 
analysts providing earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. Error is the absolute value of average forecast earnings 
minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. Dispersion is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts 
divided by actual earnings. n is the number of firm-year observations. Data constraints include forecast error less 
than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 times earnings, earnings surprise less than 5 times prior 
earnings. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from Compustat Global.  
 
 
Panel B – Information Environment Variables Before and After Codes 
 
 Before After Difference p-value 
Following 11.01 8.25 -2.76 0.00 
Error 0.3545 0.3551 0.0006 0.97 
Dispersion 0.1372 0.1545 0.0173 0.00 
Earnings Surprise 0.0558 0.0829 0.0271 0.00 
n 1640 1469 
  
Mean testing of information environment variables from before to after the introduction of corporate governance 
codes in each country. Following is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. Error 
is the absolute value of average forecast earnings minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. Dispersion is 
the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by actual earnings. n is the number of firm-year observations. 
Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 times earnings, 
earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and 
financial data is from Compustat Global.  
 
 
Panel C – Analyst Following By Company Size Before and After Codes 
 
 Before After Difference p-value 
Small companies 
(<US$100 million) 3.75 5.35 1.60 0.00 
Medium companies 
(US$100-1000 million) 11.01 8.25 -2.76 0.00 
Large companies 
(>US$1 billion) 18.06 12.93 -5.13 0.00 
Mean testing of analyst following for different size companies (in total assets) before and after the introduction of 
corporate governance codes in each country. Following is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during 
the fiscal year. Small, medium and large companies represent approximately 20, 60 and 20 percent of the sample 
respectively. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from Compustat Global.  
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Table 3 – Multivariate Tests of Information Environment Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FOLLOW FOLLOW ERROR ERROR DISPER DISPER 
       
Intercept -0.006 (0.99) 
-0.1032 
(0.95) 
0.2525 
(0.00) 
0.2534 
(0.00) 
0.1074 
(0.00) 
0.1143 
(0.00) 
PCRIS -0.5841 (0.09)  
-0.0081 
(0.67)  
0.0090 
(0.20)  
PCODE  -2.1133 (0.00)  
-0.0422 
(0.03)  
0.0022 
(0.74) 
SIZE 2.1390 (0.00) 
2.1356 
(0.00) 
-0.0229 
(0.00) 
-0.0230 
(0.00) 
0.0005 
(0.79) 
0.0004 
(0.83) 
GROWTH -1.1328 (0.05) 
-0.904 
(0.12) 
-0.1779 
(0.00) 
-0.1731 
(0.00) 
-0.0392 
(0.00) 
-0.0396 
(0.00) 
RISK 1.0905 (0.59) 
-0.2316 
(0.91) 
0.4842 
(0.00) 
0.4612 
(0.00) 
0.0782 
(0.04) 
0.0875 
(0.02) 
ES -4.1541 (0.00) 
-3.9413 
(0.00) 
0.4404 
(0.00) 
0.4455 
(0.00) 
0.0435 
(0.07) 
0.0453 
(0.06) 
LOSS -2.9558 (0.06) 
-2.9779 
(0.06) 
0.2914 
(0.01) 
0.2904 
(0.01) 
0.1306 
(0.02) 
0.1293 
(0.02) 
W~FOLLO    -0.0062 (0.00) 
-0.0066 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
0.0013 
(0.00) 
RDISPE~    
1.1980 
(0.00) 
1.1989 
(0.00)   
Adj-R² 0.2555 0.2645 0.2038 0.2062 0.0451 0.0448 
Regressions of information environment variables on crisis/code dummies and control variables for the period 
1993-2005 (excluding 1997 and 1998). FOLLOW is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during 
the fiscal year. ERROR is the absolute value of average forecast earnings minus actual earnings all divided by 
actual earnings. DISPER is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by actual earnings. PCRIS is a 
dummy variable equal to one in the years after the crisis. PCODE is a dummy variable equal to one in the years 
after the introduction of codes. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is one-year sales growth. 
RISK is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the past two years. ES is earnings surprise measured as 
earnings this period minus earnings last period. LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one if the company made a 
loss. W~FOLLO  is the error term from the analyst following regressions. R~DISPE  is the error term from the forecast 
dispersion regressions. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less 
than 1 times earnings and earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings. Analyst forecast data is obtained from 
I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from Compustat Global. All regressions include unreported country and 
industry dummy variables and robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 4 – Information Environment and Company Characteristics 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FOLLOW FOLLOW ERROR ERROR DISPER DISPER 
       
Intercept -6.6097 (0.00) 
-10.1748 
(0.00) 
0.3496 
(0.00) 
0.2448 
(0.00) 
0.1921 
(0.00) 
0.1694 
(0.00) 
PCRIS 6.8719 (0.00)  
-0.1096 
(0.15)  
-0.0865 
(0.00)  
PCODE  10.8963 (0.00)  
-0.0253 
(0.73)  
-0.0711 
(0.00) 
SIZE 3.2271 (0.00) 
3.6401 
(0.00) 
-0.0401 
(0.00) 
-0.0218 
(0.01) 
-0.0135 
(0.00) 
-0.0079 
(0.01) 
PCRIS*SIZE -1.2703 (0.00)  
0.0201 
(0.07)  
0.0163 
(0.00)  
PCODE*SIZE  -2.2504 (0.00)  
-0.0017 
(0.88)  
0.0122 
(0.00) 
GROWTH -0.7045 (0.53) 
-1.0094 
(0.22) 
-0.0979 
(0.14) 
-0.1580 
(0.00) 
-0.0439 
(0.11) 
-0.0444 
(0.01) 
PCRIS*GROWTH -0.6126 (0.64)  
-0.1130 
(0.15)  
0.0066 
(0.83)  
PCODE*GROWTH  0.5433 (0.63)  
-0.0461 
(0.49)  
0.0137 
(0.61) 
RISK 0.9447 (0.64) 
0.5775 
(0.77) 
0.4902 
(0.00) 
0.4638 
(0.00) 
0.0801 
(0.03) 
0.0824 
(0.03) 
ES -4.2559 (0.00) 
-3.8246 
(0.00) 
0.4410 
(0.00) 
0.4456 
(0.00) 
0.0448 
(0.07) 
0.0447 
(0.07) 
LOSS -2.8693 (0.07) 
-2.5146 
(0.08) 
0.2880 
(0.02) 
0.2902 
(0.01) 
0.1295 
(0.02) 
0.1270 
(0.03) 
W~FOLLO    -0.0061 (0.00) 
-0.0066 
(0.00) 
0.0015 
(0.00) 
0.0016 
(0.00) 
RDISPE~    1.1930 (0.00) 
1.2000 
(0.00)   
Adj-R² 0.2632 0.3062 0.2047 0.2058 0.0489 0.0482 
Regressions of information environment variables on crisis/code dummies and control variables for the period 
1993-2005 (excluding 1997 and 1998). FOLLOW is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during 
the fiscal year. ERROR is the absolute value of average forecast earnings minus actual earnings all divided by 
actual earnings. DISPER is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by actual earnings. PCRIS is a 
dummy variable equal to one in the years after the crisis. PCODE is a dummy variable equal to one in the years 
after the introduction of codes. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is one-year sales growth. 
RISK is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the past two years. ES is earnings surprise measured as 
earnings this period minus earnings last period. LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one if the company made a 
loss. W~FOLLO  is the error term from the analyst following regressions. R~DISPE  is the error term from the forecast 
dispersion regressions. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less 
than 1 times earnings and earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings. Analyst forecast data is obtained from 
I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from Compustat Global. All regressions include unreported country and 
industry dummy variables and robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses.  
Table 5 – Information Environment and Family Ownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FOLLOW FOLLOW FOLLOW ERROR ERROR ERROR DISPER DISPER DISPER 
          
Intercept 0.0190 (0.99) 
0.2789 
(0.92) 
0.3429 
(0.90) 
0.3053 
(0.00) 
0.2914 
(0.01) 
0.2974 
(0.00) 
0.1079 
(0.00) 
0.0993 
(0.01) 
0.1092 
(0.01) 
PCRIS  -0.5005 (0.60)   
0.0296 
(0.39)   
0.0195 
(0.08)  
PCODE   -2.5854 (0.01)   
0.0262 
(0.48)   
-0.0046 
(0.71) 
FAMILY -1.8849 (0.01) 
-1.7043 
(0.10) 
-1.6046 
(0.08) 
-0.0072 
(0.81) 
-0.0283 
(0.36) 
0.0138 
(0.68) 
-0.0040 
(0.69) 
-0.0214 
(0.08) 
-0.0075 
(0.56) 
PCRIS*FAMILY  -0.2651 (0.83)   
0.0295 
(0.51)   
0.0240 
(0.14)  
PCODE*FAMILY   -0.9862 (0.45)   
-0.0518 
(0.34)   
0.0084 
(0.66) 
SIZE 2.7925 (0.00) 
2.7918 
(0.00) 
2.8245 
(0.00) 
-0.0194 
(0.11) 
-0.0193 
(0.11) 
-0.0262 
(0.48) 
-0.0033 
(0.44) 
-0.0032 
(0.45) 
-0.0032 
(0.46) 
GROWTH -0.1637 (0.90) 
-0.1658 
(0.90) 
0.2650 
(0.83) 
-0.1183 
(0.02) 
-0.1177 
(0.02) 
-0.1173 
(0.02) 
-0.0443 
(0.05) 
-0.0438 
(0.04) 
-0.0444 
(0.05) 
RISK 22.3124 (0.00) 
23.0148 
(0.00) 
18.4178 
(0.00) 
0.3240 
(0.05) 
0.2760 
(0.10) 
0.3394 
(0.03) 
0.2501 
(0.00) 
0.2163 
(0.01) 
0.2471 
(0.00) 
ES -3.4769 (0.27) 
-3.1511 
(0.33) 
-3.7970 
(0.22) 
0.4379 
(0.03) 
0.4150 
(0.04) 
0.4333 
(0.03) 
0.1411 
(0.02) 
0.1248 
(0.04) 
0.1418 
(0.02) 
LOSS -4.2598 (0.02) 
-4.3029 
(0.02) 
-2.7116 
(0.13) 
0.4297 
(0.01) 
0.4317 
(0.01) 
0.4397 
(0.01) 
0.2085 
(0.05) 
0.2096 
(0.05) 
0.2070 
(0.05) 
W~FOLLO     -0.0021 (0.21) 
-0.0021 
(0.21) 
-0.0023 
(0.20) 
-0.0001 
(0.94) 
-0.0001 
(0.94) 
-0.0001 
(0.88) 
RDISPE~           
Adj-R² 0.3339 0.3326 0.3488 0.0783 0.0781 0.0770 0.0923 0.0994 0.0901 
Regressions of information environment variables on crisis/code dummies, family ownership and control variables for the period 1993-2005 (excluding 1997 
and 1998). FOLLOW is the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. ERROR is the absolute value of average forecast earnings 
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minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. DISPER is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by actual earnings. PCRIS is a dummy 
variable equal to one in the years after the crisis. PCODE is a dummy variable equal to one in the years after the introduction of codes. FAMILY is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the company’s largest shareholder is the founding family. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is one-year sales 
growth. RISK is the standard deviation of monthly returns over the past two years. ES is earnings surprise measured as earnings this period minus earnings last 
period. LOSS is a dummy variable equal to one if the company made a loss. W~FOLLO  is the error term from the analyst following regressions. R~DISPE  is the 
error term from the forecast dispersion regressions. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 times 
earnings and earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from Compustat 
Global. All regressions include unreported country and industry dummy variables and robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. 
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Table 6 – Information Environment Variables and Market Value (TQ) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Intercept 1.4420 (0.00) 
1.6830 
(0.00) 
1.4162 
(0.00) 
1.4156 
(0.00) 
1.7320 
(0.00) 
1.4522 
(0.00) 
1.3372 
(0.00) 
1.6883 
(0.00) 
1.3786 
(0.00) 
PCRIS  -0.2678 (0.00)   
-0.3683 
(0.00)   
-0.4056 
(0.00)  
PCODE   -0.1029 (0.01)   
-0.2889 
(0.00)   
-0.2970 
(0.00) 
FOLLOW 0.0280 (0.00) 
0.0321 
(0.00) 
0.0292 
(0.00)       
FOLLOW*PCRIS  -0.0061 (0.13)        
FOLLOW*PCODE   -0.0069 (0.03)       
ERROR    -0.1033 (0.00) 
-0.1297 
(0.08) 
-0.1823 
(0.00)    
ERROR*PCRIS     0.0472 (0.50)     
ERROR*PCODE      0.1572 (0.00)    
DISPER       0.0823 (0.39) 
-0.1434 
(0.35) 
-0.1245 
(0.38) 
DISPER*PCRIS        0.3429 (0.04)  
DISPER*PCODE         0.4445 (0.01) 
SIZE -0.1381 (0.00) 
-0.1413 
(0.00) 
-0.1351 
(0.00) 
-0.0789 
(0.00) 
-0.0834 
(0.00) 
-0.0805 
(0.00) 
-0.0757 
(0.00) 
-0.0813 
(0.00) 
-0.0773 
(0.00) 
GROWTH 0.1208 (0.04) 
0.1169 
(0.04) 
0.1322 
(0.03) 
0.0738 
(0.19) 
0.0733 
(0.17) 
0.0888 
(0.12) 
0.0937 
(0.10) 
0.0917 
(0.09) 
0.1105 
(0.05) 
ROA 6.2602 (0.00) 
6.4127 
(0.00) 
6.4262 
(0.00) 
6.6083 
(0.00) 
6.7905 
(0.00) 
6.8283 
(0.00) 
6.8450 
(0.00) 
7.0124 
(0.00) 
7.0770 
(0.00) 
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LEV 0.5000 (0.00) 
0.5212 
(0.00) 
0.5044 
(0.00) 
0.4801 
(0.00) 
0.5027 
(0.00) 
0.4892 
(0.00) 
0.4822 
(0.00) 
0.5012 
(0.00) 
0.4891 
(0.00) 
Adj-R² 0.3898 0.4106 0.3963 0.3336 0.3566 0.3472 0.3307 0.3551 0.3439 
Regressions of market value (TQ) on information environment variables for the period 1993-2005 (excluding 1997 and 1998). Tobin’s Q ratios (TQ) are 
calculated as total assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity all divided by total assets. PCRIS is a dummy variable equal to one in the 
years after the crisis. PCODE is a dummy variable equal to one in the years after the introduction of codes. FOLLOW is the number of analysts providing 
earnings forecasts during the fiscal year. ERROR is the absolute value of average forecast earnings minus actual earnings all divided by actual earnings. 
DISPER is the standard deviation of earnings forecasts divided by actual earnings. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. GROWTH is one-year sales 
growth. ROA is return on assets. LEV is the leverage ratio. Data constraints include forecast error less than 5 times earnings, forecast dispersion less than 1 
times earnings and earnings surprise less than 5 times prior earnings, Tobin’s Q ratios between 0 and 10, return on assets between -100% and 500%, leverage 
between 0 and 100% and sales growth between -500% and 500%. Analyst forecast data is obtained from I/B/E/S and price and financial data is from 
Compustat Global. All regressions include unreported country and industry dummy variables and robust standard errors. P-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
